Disentangling Nature's Joints by Tahko, Tuomas
1 
 
Disentangling Nature’s Joints 
TUOMAS E. TAHKO (www.ttahko.net) 
University of Helsinki 
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent arguments in favour of monism based on quantum holism as well as other arguments from 
quantum mechanics pose an interesting challenge for neo-Aristotelian pluralist substance ontology. 
How can the neo-Aristotelian respond to this challenge? In this article, Jonathan Schaffer’s priority 
monism is the main target. It will be argued that the case from quantum mechanics in favour of 
priority monism faces some challenges of its own. Moreover, if the neo-Aristotelian is willing to 
consider alternative ways to understand ‘substance’, there may yet be hope for a pluralist substance 
ontology. A speculative case for such an ontology will be constructed based on primitive 
incompatibility. 
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1. Introduction 
In the neo-Aristotelian tradition, the category of substance is typically regarded as the most 
fundamental of the ontological categories. Substance is the starting point of neo-Aristotelian 
ontology, the root of being qua being.1 The neo-Aristotelian can claim the support of common sense 
for this commitment to substance: the idea that there are such individual substances like people, 
cats, and trees is certainly part of everyday ontology. On the face of it, science might seem to 
support the view too, at least while we remain at a fairly high level of generality. As Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz put it, a plausible understanding of ‘thing’ is just that it means ‘individual substance’.2 
But it is well known that this type of common sense approach to ontology faces serious challenges 
from contemporary science and especially from those philosophers of science who defend ontic 
structural realism. A central tenet of this approach is exactly that science has shown the ‘folk 
ontology’ to be misleading, as nothing corresponding to the neo-Aristotelian substance can be 
found; every ‘thing’ must go.3 Perhaps that’s not exactly right. After all, even if the individual 
substances that we typically postulate have to go, there would still be one potential candidate: the 
world, the universe, the cosmos, the spacetime as a whole.4 This would lead us towards some type 
of monism, an approach which is enjoying something of a revival, especially due to Jonathan 
Schaffer’s influential work.5 
 How should the neo-Aristotelian friend of substance react to these developments? At 
the very least, the neo-Aristotelian should examine the relevant arguments. Some of the most 
                                                 
1 For a general overview on substance, see Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994, 1997). I will not attempt to make any 
claims about Aristotle’s own views regarding substances here, but for discussion linking the historical notion of 
substance and the neo-Aristotelian one, see Hoffman (2012); see also other articles in Tahko (2012a) for various views 
on categories. I should also add a caveat: although this article defends the possibility of maintaining the category of 
substance, I am myself thoroughly fallibilist about this issue. Should science conclusively show that substance is not a 
feasible category, I would be prepared to give it up. Hence, my own approach to the neo-Aristotelian tradition is very 
much methodological rather than substantial (see, e.g., Tahko (2013) for further discussion). 
2 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997): 1. 
3 Ladyman and Ross et al. (2007). 
4 Schaffer (2009). 
5 E.g., Schaffer (2010a, 2010b). 
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influential arguments build on quantum theory and the phenomenon of quantum entanglement in 
particular. Examining these arguments and their consequences for the idea of substance is precisely 
what I will aim to do in what follows. The focus is on one of Schaffer’s central arguments, which 
will be outlined in the second section. We will then proceed to look at the underlying science in 
some more detail in the third section and highlight some open questions, which put Schaffer’s 
argument in new a light. It will become apparent that the upshot of Schaffer’s argument, if 
successful, would be even more radical than it first seems, and this poses a challenge for the 
dialectic of the argument. In the fourth section, a reconciliation is sought and a novel way of 
understanding substance is proposed, where primitive incompatibility is introduced as a necessary 
condition for substancehood. Finally, in the fifth section, we will examine how primitive 
incompatibility might be traced to quantum ontology, with special attention to wave function 
realism. 
 
2. Schaffer’s monism and the argument from entanglement 
The type of monism that Schaffer defends is priority monism. This is a less radical view than 
monism understood as the view that exactly one thing exists, sometimes called existence monism, 
which Schaffer takes to be an uncharitable understanding of monism – he in fact refers to Hoffman 
and Rosenkrantz and associates this type of uncharitable approach with them.6 Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz write as follows: 
 
                                                 
6 Schaffer (2010a): 32; Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997): 77. 
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Monism […] is inconsistent with something that appears to be an evident datum of 
experience, namely, that there is a plurality of things. We shall assume that a 
plurality of material things exists, and hence that monism is false.7 
 
But recall that by ‘thing’, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz mean ‘individual substance’, whereas 
Schaffer’s view is that there is exactly one substance, be it spacetime, the cosmos, or whatever we 
might want to call it.8 For Schaffer, ‘substance’ is a fundamental entity9, but Schaffer’s monism 
does not deny that there could be other ‘things’ in the world, it’s just that those ‘things’ are not 
(fundamental) substances, but rather mere arbitrary parts of the cosmos.10 So, the view is that the 
cosmos, the integrated whole, is ontologically prior to these arbitrary parts.11 Nevertheless, Schaffer 
thinks that there is exactly one substance and indeed exactly one ‘thing’, if ‘thing’ is understood to 
refer to substances: material objects are not a second, distinct kind of substance.12 To be clear: 
Schaffer is not denying that there is a plurality of dependent ‘things’, but for him these ‘things’ 
cannot be substances, because substances are fundamental entities. Yet, the type of pluralism that, 
e.g., Hoffman and Rosenkrantz favour, requires that individual substances are not dependent on the 
cosmos in Schaffer’s sense: they are to be regarded as ontologically independent.13 In fact, Hoffman 
and Rosenkrantz note that Aristotle’s view was precisely that individual substances are fundamental 
and everything else depends on them, not vice versa.14 So on this view, pluralism about ‘things’ is a 
pluralism about the fundamental ‘things’ and hence in direct opposition to Schaffer’s view. 
                                                 
7 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997): 78. 
8 See Schaffer (2009). 
9 Schaffer (2009): 131. 
10 Schaffer (2010a): 49. 
11 Schaffer puts forward an argument from common sense, which is supposed to establish that the many proper parts of 
the cosmos are arbitrary portions of the cosmos and hence that the cosmos is prior to its many proper parts. For 
discussion and an attempted refutation of this argument, see O’Conaill and Tahko (2012); see also other articles in Goff 
(ed.) (2012) for further discussion on various versions of monism and their history. 
12 Schaffer (2009): 133. 
13 At least in one sense or another; see Tahko and Lowe (2015) for discussion. 
14 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994): 35. 
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 Leaving aside these complications, we can proceed to what is clearly supposed to be 
one of Schaffer’s central arguments for priority monism: the argument from quantum holism. We 
can approach the idea via Quantum Field Theory (or Theories) (QFT), as Schaffer himself does.15 
QFT is sometimes presented as if it is a natural ally for the monist, since it paints a picture of the 
cosmos as one consisting of fields rather than particles. This may seem like an immediate challenge 
for the pluralist, because if the material things that we typically associate with individual substances 
are just something like excitations of an underlying field16, then they would seem to be only an 
idealization, not something with sharp boundaries.17  It should be noted that this may be a bit of a 
simplification, since there could more than one fundamental field. Moreover, one might question 
the assumption that QFT is a fundamental theory.18 Moreover, it is often thought that some quantum 
theory is true and universal and hence all fields would be quantum fields.19 In any case, there is 
little doubt that this type of view – that modern science and QFTs in particular should drive us to 
abandon pluralism about individual substances – is present in physics, and perhaps even more 
widespread among philosophers of physics. Schaffer himself mentions several examples, such as H. 
Dieter Zeh, who claims that the formalism of QFT has always suggested that we ought to abandon 
the ‘primordial particle concept’ and replace it with fields.20 So Schaffer’s argument has at least 
some support among the practicing scientists – we will return to this in the next section. What is the 
                                                 
15 Schaffer (2010a): 54. 
16 Schaffer (2009): 143. 
17 Schaffer (2010a): 48; compare with Tahko (2012b). 
18 Thanks to the editors of this volume and especially Nic Teh for these observations. 
19 Thanks to Alastair Wilson for pointing this out. 
20 Zeh (2003). 
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actual argument though? It proceeds from the phenomenon of quantum entanglement to quantum 
holism and then straightforwardly to priority monism.21 Here is a reconstruction:22 
 
1. The quantum state of an entangled system contains information over and above 
the information carried by the quantum states of its components. 
2. The cosmos forms one vast entangled system. 
3. Entangled systems are fundamental wholes. 
4. The cosmos is a fundamental whole. 
  
 Premise 2 requires further support. Schaffer suggests that it can be supported by 
physics or mathematics.23 Firstly, if the world begins with the Big Bang, where everything interacts, 
this initial state of entanglement is preserved if we assume that the world evolves in a linear fashion, 
e.g., in terms of Schrödinger’s equation. Secondly, if we assume that there is a universal wave-
function, then ‘it is virtually certain that it will be entangled since measure 1 of all wave-functions 
are entangled’.24 Now, it is worth noting, as Schaffer does, that these reasons in favour of premise 2 
are only plausible if wave function collapse is ruled out as a form of the universe’s evolution. This 
clearly rules out collapse approaches to quantum theory, but since Schaffer is quite aware of these 
                                                 
21 When two systems become entangled via some physical interaction and then separate after some time, they cannot be 
described in the same way as before (Schrödinger (1935)). Or as Schaffer (2010a): 51 puts it: ‘An entangled system is 
one whose state vector is not factorizable into tensor products of the state vectors of its n components.’ Importantly, 
entanglement is the cause of the seemingly unavoidable nonlocality, ‘spooky action at a distance’, which Einstein found 
unpalatable and which Bell’s famous theorem demonstrated. See Bub (2015) for further details. Note that the argument 
at hand does not concern QFT as such – any approach to quantum theory must engage with the phenomenon of 
entanglement one way or another. 
22 Based on Schaffer (2010a): 50–7; see premises 6-8. 
23 Schaffer (2010a): 52. 
24 Ibid. 
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limitations, I will set them aside as well (although we will refer to collapse approaches later on).25 
So let us assume that premise 2 is true. 
 What about premise 3? Schaffer argues that ‘Democritean pluralism’ – the idea that 
there are particles that have intrinsic physical properties and stand in external spatiotemporal 
relations – cannot account for properties of the entangled system. In fact, this idea is already 
implicit in premise 1 (which Schaffer himself does not list as a separate premise). The idea is that 
the entangled system is ‘emergent’ and cannot be reduced to its proper parts: ‘The physical 
properties of the whole are not fixed by the total intrinsic properties of any subsystems’.26 This idea 
is elaborated on in Ismael and Schaffer, where entanglement is analyzed in terms of 
nonseparability.27 This leads towards the type of quantum holism that we’ve seen Schaffer to 
favour, with some form of emergence as the upshot: the composite system seems to be more than 
the sum of its parts. As a potential pluralist rejoinder, Schaffer considers the possibility of 
introducing fundamental, external entanglement relations, which might enable the pluralist to retain 
particles (and hence individual substances). However, he rightly points out that it’s not at all clear 
that particles could be retained in such a theory, for as we already saw there is no clear place for 
them in the ontology of QFT (this is assuming that QFT is a fundamental theory, of course). 
Assuming that external entanglement relations will not help in saving pluralism, the conclusion 
follows from premises 2 and 3. 
 
                                                 
25 Note also that we should distinguish between the Copenhagen interpretation -style collapse theories and objective 
collapse theories such as the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) approach. 
26 Schaffer (2010a): 53). Schaffer (2010a): 55 goes on to offer an argument from the possibility of emergence in favour 
of monism, but as we can see, that would not really be a distinct argument, as some sort of emergence is implicitly 
assumed already in the argument at hand. 
27 Ismael and Schaffer (Forthcoming): §2.1.3. 
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3. A tangled argument 
Let us now take a moment to consider the dialectic of Schaffer’s argument for priority monism in 
more detail. In particular, I’d like to highlight the commitment to emergence, which is evident from 
premise 1 of the reconstructed argument. The background of the idea is in fact something that we 
can see in the physics literature as well, and since Schaffer draws on this literature, we ought to 
acknowledge this. One way to introduce the idea is via decoherence, which concerns the appearance 
of classicality when quantum coherence is removed.28 As our starting point, we can take the double-
slit experiment. To get the correct result for the probability of an electron passing through a 
particular slit, we have to take into account interference, which depends on both components of the 
wave that splits when it encounters the slits. This produces the familiar interference pattern. Now, 
decoherence becomes evident when this trademark feature of quantum systems, the interference, is 
not observed and instead we have a system that appears to conform to a classical interpretation. But 
the reason for this appearance of classicality is that a system will also interact with its environment 
and indeed it will become entangled with its environment. This phenomenon can be produced 
simply by performing the double-slit experiment and observing the slits. So decoherence gives us 
the appearance of wave function collapse without requiring that such a collapse really occurs. But 
decoherence can also emerge spontaneously, because the system unavoidably interacts with stray 
air particles etc.  
This produces a general problem: the world appears to be classical and to consist of 
individual and distinct macro-objects, but if there is classicality in appearance only, then can we 
have even ‘emergent’ macro-objects? If the answer is supposed to be ‘yes’, then at the very least we 
need a story about how this works, ultimately, about how the facts about the ‘emergent’ macro-
                                                 
28 For an in-depth introduction to decoherence, see Bacciagaluppi (2016). For an accessible account of the philosophical 
implications of decoherence, see Crull (2013). See also Wallace (2012) for an extensive discussion of decoherence and 
the emergence of ‘macro-objects’. As Crull (2013): 879 notes sometimes ‘classicality’ is just understood as ‘lack of 
interference’. 
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objects are grounded in the wave function of a system.29 We will return to this in section 5, where 
we discuss the notorious macro-object problem in more detail. 
 Let me tie this idea back to Schaffer’s argument. In his most recent work, with Jenann 
Ismael, one possible approach being considered is wave function realism, i.e., the view that ‘the 
wave function is a fundamental object and a real, physical field on configuration space’.30 This is 
also a topic that will be discussed in more detail in section 5, but the context of the discussion is the 
following idea: 
 
[Q]uantum mechanics seems to allow two entities—call them Alice and Bob—to be 
in separate places, while being in states that cannot be fully specified without 
reference to each other. Alice herself thus seems incomplete (and likewise Bob), not 
an independent building block of reality, but perhaps at best a fragment of the more 
complete composite Alice-Bob system (and ultimately a fragment of the whole 
interconnected universe).31 
 
The quantum holist faces precisely the type of problem that we saw above with respect to the 
phenomenon of decoherence, namely, in what sense, besides in appearance only, are Alice and Bob 
individual and distinct at all, if they are fundamentally nonseparable? Ismael and Schaffer entertain 
various ways in which we might consider Alice and Bob to emerge as ‘modally connected non-
identical events’ from a common portion of reality.32 For the sake of brevity, I will here discuss just 
one of these, based on wave function realism. Ismael and Schaffer suggest that: ‘For the wave 
function realist, assuming that there is even such a thing as familiar three-dimensional space, it is to 
                                                 
29 Thanks to Christina Conroy for pressing on this issue. 
30 Ney 2013a): 37. 
31 Ismael and Schaffer (Forthcoming): [1]. 
32 Ismael and Schaffer (Forthcoming): [12] ff. 
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be treated as a derivative (or emergent) structure, and not a fundamental aspect of reality’.33 We 
should note here that even though the quantum holist may prefer to talk about ‘derivativeness’ 
rather than ‘emergence’, the basic problem – how do we explain the appearance of classicality and 
the apparent distinctness of three-dimensional macro-objects such as Alice and Bob – is 
nevertheless the same. 
 Returning to Schaffer’s original argument, recall that a crucial – although implicit – 
premise of the argument is that the whole, the cosmos, is somehow emergent and contains 
information over and above the information carried by the quantum states of its components. It is 
important for Schaffer’s project that even though the emergent whole is prior to its parts, the whole 
does indeed have parts and hence we can get the classical objects, Alice and Bob, out of priority 
monism: ‘the monist can guarantee a complete inventory of basic objects’.34 Schaffer’s various 
allusions to decoherence suggest that it may be via decoherence that Schaffer hopes to guarantee – 
or at least motivate – the possibility of maintaining the inventory of basic objects.35 The work on 
decoherence has made it clear that ‘nonseparable quantum systems nevertheless typically 
approximate separable closed classical systems very closely’.36 Even if nonseparable quantum 
systems are ultimately holistic, they nevertheless seem to have features very similar to those of 
classical systems. But one might argue that this is not taking nonseparability and the project of 
quantum holism to its logical conclusion. This line of thought requires tackling the underlying 
quantum ontology in more detail. 
 To give an example of an attempted explanation of quantum holism with the required 
level of detail, one might endorse something like the Bohm-Hiley project for an ‘undivided 
universe’, which ‘requires not only a listing of all its constituent particles and their positions, but 
                                                 
33 Ismael and Schaffer (Forthcoming): [17]. 
34 Schaffer (2010a): 57. 
35 E.g., Schaffer (2010a): 53n31, Ismael and Schaffer (Forthcoming): [21], 
36 Ismael and Schaffer (Forthcoming): [21]. 
11 
 
also of a field associated with the wave-function that guides their trajectories’.37 This is the idea of a 
‘pilot-wave’ postulated in the de Broglie–Bohm theory, which connects again with the phenomenon 
of decoherence – although as Bacciagaluppi notes, in the de Broglie-Bohm theory we effectively 
have two mechanisms connected to apparent collapse and hence the emergence of classicality.38 So, 
the Bohmian project as well will have to answer the question of where the classicality emerges 
from, but the reason why it might appear attractive is that the de Broglie-Bohm theory can refer to 
decoherence when it comes to the emergence of classical structures and also provide an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics that ‘explains why these structures are indeed observationally 
relevant’.39 
 The upshot for Schaffer’s project is that none of the intriguing work inspired by 
decoherence is going to give the priority monist the objectivity that the account needs – not without 
a completed quantum ontology. One source of the problem specifically for Schaffer is that he 
wishes to avoid committing to existence monism as it has been traditionally understood, i.e., that 
there is just one thing. As we saw, Schaffer favours priority monism instead, and he takes it that 
there is a plurality of ‘things’, albeit only as parts of the whole – the cosmos. Chris Fields has 
recently challenged this.40 Here is a representative passage from Schaffer: 
 
[Q]uantum entanglement is a case of emergence, in the specific sense of a property 
of an object that has proper parts, which property is not fixed by the intrinsic 
properties of its proper parts and the fundamental relations between its proper 
parts.41 
                                                 
37 Healey (2016): §9. See, also Bohm and Hiley (1993). 
38 Bacciagaluppi (2016: §3.2.1. 
39 Bacciagaluppi (2016): §3.2.1. For further discussion, see Pylkkänen, Hiley, and Pättiniemi (2015). 
40 Fields (2014a). 
41 Schaffer (2010a): 55. Also quoted in Fields (2014a): 143. 
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 The worry is that Schaffer’s account of quantum entanglement as a case of emergence 
will not get off the ground without an objective sense of ‘proper part’ – essentially, to view parts as 
localized ‘systems’.42 Fields suggests that what would be needed here is some reason to think that 
‘the notion of universal entanglement is consistent with any coherent mereotopology that yields 
elementary particles or any other proposed propertied fundamental objects as persistently 
identifiable, localizable parts’.43 The challenge, due to Fields, is that the phenomenon of 
decoherence appears to be of no help in achieving anything but the illusion of such objective sense 
of ‘proper part’. Fields insists, quite correctly, that an explanatory gap remains, since the classical 
world is a ‘world of discrete, identifiable, time-persistent objects’; decoherence does not give us any 
principled reason to regard some collection of elementary particles as this type of a discrete object 
over any other.44 But some such reason – an account of when and which proper parts compose an 
object – would be needed if we are to, as it were, reconstruct the classical world. There have of 
course been attempts to do so in the literature. Fields considers Wojciech Zurek’s idea of ‘quantum 
Darwinism’, where classicality emerges due to the environment encoding information about a 
system during the process of decoherence.45 Zurek suggests that the process is based on a 
‘Darwinian’ mechanism that is ultimately responsible for the fact that only some of the potential 
collections of elementary particles are recognized (by us, the observers) as objects. But we need not 
dwell on such speculative ideas, for Schaffer himself does not rely on anything of the sort. This 
should, at any rate, be enough to highlight that a further story is needed here. 
 The more general upshot is that given Schaffer’s premises, there would appear to be 
reasons to favour a much more extreme version of monism than Schaffer hoped. This is due to the 
tension identified by Fields, i.e., taking the cosmos to be an emergent, entangled whole does not 
                                                 
42 Fields (2014a). See also Dorato (2016), where Schaffer’s priority monism is put to test with reference to Rovelli’s 
relational approach to quantum mechanics (RQM) – Dorato’s conclusion is that RQM does not support monism. 
43 Fields (2014a): 144; see also Fields (2014b). 
44 Fields (2014a): 137. 
45 Zurek (2003, 2009). 
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appear to be consistent with objective proper parthood. So, if Schaffer holds on to the idea of 
‘universal entanglement’, then he may end up back with the ‘uncharitable’ interpretation of 
monism, i.e., that only one thing exists46: 
 
[I]f quantum effects such as entanglement do not disappear at large scales, then the 
“classical world” is not an approximation but an illusion, and our ordinary notions 
of objecthood, locality, independence and causation are not approximately right but 
rather straightforwardly wrong. Such a conclusion flies in the face of all of our 
intuitions, and is difficult even to consider as a theoretical option.47 
 
 It is worth highlighting that we seem to have ended up with a position equivalent with 
the version of monism that we saw Hoffman and Rosenkrantz to dismiss as evidently inconsistent 
with experience. This is the view according to which there are ‘no particles, pebbles, planets, or any 
other parts to the world’.48 Even Schaffer admits this to be potentially as implausible as Fields 
suggests in the passage quoted above: ‘Perhaps monism would deserve to be dismissed as obviously 
false, given this interpretation’.49 The challenge is that Schaffer’s argument, at least on the present 
interpretation of decoherence, may lead us towards this very view. If this is right, then the choice 
we face is between existence (rather than priority) monism and some version of genuine pluralism. 
Yet, we have seen that it’s difficult to understand how genuine pluralism could be reconciled with 
quantum mechanics, at least if we assume a non-collapse approach. Let us see if we make some 
progress. 
                                                 
46 Schaffer (2010a): 32, 52. 
47 Fields (2014a): 144. 
48 Schaffer (2010a): 32. 
49 Ibid. 
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4. Substances disentangled: primitive incompatibility 
Having seen the tangles in the argument for priority monism from quantum entanglement, one 
might think that the options are clear: either we should bite the bullet and endorse existence monism 
rather than Schaffer’s priority monism, or we should follow Hoffman and Rosenkrantz and dismiss 
monism as altogether unpalatable. But perhaps this is uncharitable. After all, Schaffer has plenty of 
other arguments in favour of priority monism, and even the case presented above is far from 
conclusive. This is not the place to attempt an assessment of all the arguments in favour of priority 
monism. Instead, let us approach the issue from the opposite end, by trying to reconstruct a 
pluralist, neo-Aristotelian substance ontology, given the challenges raised by quantum theory. The 
goal here will be primarily just to motivate the idea – apparently challenged by some approaches to 
quantum theory – that there could be such things as individual substances: things, objects, entities 
with objective boundaries. I shall not attempt to be faithful to Aristotle or even the neo-Aristotelian 
tradition in what follows. I am merely interested in the basic idea of joints in nature, joints that 
distinguish one kind of thing from another kind of thing. The existence of such joints would not be 
a sufficient condition for the existence of individual substances, but their existence does at least 
seem to be a necessary condition.  
In fact, the strategy that I propose is to focus on properties rather than substances, for 
if we have some reason to think that there are properties that cannot be had by one thing at the same 
time – simultaneously instantiated incompatible properties – then we would already have at least a 
prima facie reason to postulate more than one thing and hence some boundary or distinguishing 
feature between these two (or more) things. As a matter of fact, Aristotle’s work is a natural starting 
point when it comes to this theme, even though he discusses the theme of incompatibility also quite 
separately from that of substance. 
15 
 
 In Categories, Aristotle discusses a distinctive feature of substances: that they are able 
to receive contraries.50 By this he means that a substance, like an individual man, can be hot at one 
time and cold at another time. The existence of contraries – properties like hotness and coldness – 
does not itself in any way imply that there is more than one substance. But it may help to get us 
started to think about the difference between contrariety and incompatibility, as we see it in 
Aristotle’s work. The important idea is that if contrary properties are instantiated at the same time, 
then it would seem that they cannot be instantiated by one and the same substance. It is precisely 
this idea of incompatibility that I wish to draw on. I will propose that by taking incompatibility to 
be primitive and worldly, we can motivate the acceptance of a plurality of individual substances. 
 The idea of primitive incompatibility is certainly traceable to Aristotle, but I should 
note that the idea has crept up repeatedly in more recent literature, especially in well-known 
attempts to define negation and to come up with truthmakers for negative truths.51 I will not discuss 
these attempts here, interesting though they are. All we need for the argument at hand is the idea of 
primitive incompatibility. In Aristotle, the idea of incompatibility is at its clearest in some of his 
formulations of the law of non-contradiction (LNC). The following is my personal favourite: 
 
The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same 
subject in the same respect.52 
 
This formulation of LNC focuses on attributes, which make for a particularly intuitive example of 
primitive incompatibility: it seems plausible that, say, a particle cannot at the same time both be 
charged and not be charged. Once we have grasped this idea, we can expand on it to the case of 
                                                 
50 Aristotle, Categories 4a10–21. 
51 See, e.g., Demos (1917), Price (1990), Molnar (2000), and Berto (2015). 
52 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1005b19–20. 
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mutually exclusive properties. A particle cannot only both have and not have a charge at the same 
time, it also cannot both have a negative and a positive charge at the same time – these properties 
are incompatible. In Categories Aristotle writes about ‘contrariety’ rather than ‘incompatibility’, 
but as I noted it is in fact the latter which will be our focus here. It may nevertheless be helpful to 
compare the two notions as to observe that there is an aspect of contrariety that differs significantly 
from incompatibility: the former would seem to come in degrees, whereas the latter does not. We 
might ask: How many contraries can a proposition have? Following the Aristotelian formulation of 
LNC, it would seem that any incompatible attributes are also contraries. But even if incompatibles 
are also contraries, contrariety clearly comes in degrees: saying of something black that it is not 
white is different from saying that it is not grey, even though whiteness and greyness are just as 
incompatible with blackness – we might think that being grey is closer to being black (and closer to 
being white) than blackness and whiteness are to each other. Or if colours are confusing here, think 
of properties like being tall and being short. The idea is clear from Aristotle himself: 
 
Since things which differ from one another may do so to a greater or a less degree, 
there exists also a greatest difference, and this I call ’contrariety’.53 
It seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial 
metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which within the same class, 
are separated by the greatest possible distance.54 
Here it seems that Aristotle in fact suggests to use ‘contrariety’ to describe absolute dissimilarity – 
at least sometimes. But simply the suggestion that there could be a spatial metaphor of contrariety 
distances the notion from the understanding of primitive incompatibility that I have in mind.  
                                                 
53 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1055a4–6. 
54 Aristotle, Categories 6a15–19. 
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 We might illustrate contrariety as follows:55 
                           
 
WHITE    GREY                        BLACK 
 
 
 Based on Figure 1, we can define polar contraries (white and black) and immediate 
contraries (white and not-white), where immediate contraries are incompatible precisely in the 
sense that we are interested in.56 If we wish to insist that primitive incompatibility itself does not 
come in degrees, which is indeed central to our argument, I now suggest to set contrariety aside and 
focus on incompatibility proper. This happens fairly naturally if we try to adapt the previous 
illustration to a case like charge: 
   
 
e-   no charge?                               e+ 
 
       
 In Figure 2, there are no degrees of contrariety. Electrons have unit negative charge 
(the elementary charge), which has an interesting role: all freely existing charged particles have a 
charge similar in magnitude either to the unit negative charge or an integer multiple of it. So it 
                                                 
55 Adapted from Horn (2001): 38. 
56 On ‘polarity’, see also Beall (2000). 
Neither white nor black 
Not-white 
Figure 1 
Neither electron nor positron 
Not-electron 
Figure 2 
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appears that the route from electron to positron could only involve neutral charge as an intermediate 
contrast; there are no degrees. Moreover, a neutral particle is a very different kind of thing than a 
charged particle (it is subject to different laws, for one thing), so it doesn’t really perform the same 
job as ‘GREY’ does in Figure 1. This simple case of electron vs. positron gives us an easy example 
of incompatible properties. Since we are dealing (supposedly) with fundamental particles, this gives 
us at least a preliminary reason to think that incompatibility could be a fundamental feature of 
reality.57 The case is really not that different from charge: macrophysical objects don’t tend to 
manifest charge in the same way that subatomic particles do, even though their existence requires 
bonding behaviour that is enabled exactly by the charges of their constituent particles. When we 
study charge, it’s exactly the unit negative charge of electrons – also known as the fundamental unit 
of charge – that turns out to be the most interesting. I will not attempt to construct a further 
argument here in favour of taking incompatibility as a primitive, worldly feature, but let me note 
that the idea has been (re-)gaining popularity. Francesco Berto’s recent account is a good example; 
he thinks that there’s evidence that incompatibility ‘carves nature at its joints’.58 Berto himself 
focuses on the semantic and logical aspects of the account and is interested in incompatibility as a 
basis for negation, but for our purposes it is precisely the idea that incompatibility is a genuine 
feature of reality that is important. Does this idea survive when we move on to quantum ontology? 
 
5. Substances disentangled: incompatibility and the wave function 
So far I’ve been speaking quite loosely about the idea of primitive incompatibility. One might for 
instance question the previous example concerning electrons, since it was assumed that electrons 
are particles – individual substances. But all this was just to get an initial understanding of 
                                                 
57 One might argue that this is just a nomic rather than a metaphysical feature of reality, in which case incompatibility 
might not be fundamental. But even if this is the case, those who consider (some) laws of nature to be metaphysically 
necessary could arrive at the desired result. I will not discuss the status of the laws of nature here, but see Tahko (2015) 
for discussion. Thanks to Alastair Wilson for pointing out this issue. 
58 Berto (2015): 11; see also Berto (2008). 
19 
 
incompatibility. In order to use the idea of incompatibility in an argument in favour of pluralism, we 
of course better not assume at the outset that there is a plurality of things. So, let us get back to 
quantum theory, which is what motivated Schaffer’s argument in favour of monism. As we have 
seen, the key issue here is how classicality emerges at the macroscopic level, for the macroscopic 
world at the very least looks and feels as if it is classical and contains a plurality of objects with 
objective boundaries. Not that I propose to solve this problem here; we are effectively dealing with 
one of the central interpretive problems concerning quantum mechanics, what Alyssa Ney calls the 
macro-object problem: ‘the problem is to explain how the wave function of a system could ground 
facts about macroscopic objects’.59 One thing that is important to note here is that the solution to 
this problem – or more specifically, the possibility of pluralist substance ontology – does not 
necessarily depend on which approach to quantum mechanics is adopted. This is because there are 
versions of all the major approaches that may enable the type of ontology that the neo-Aristotelian 
seeks. In fact, it seems that we might be able to classify approaches to quantum mechanics that 
could do the trick on the basis of a single feature: whether or not the approach favours wave 
function monism.60 This is the view that, fundamentally, a wave function is all there is; this view 
also assumes wave function realism, a view which we already mentioned in passing above: ‘the 
wave function is a fundamental object and a real, physical field on configuration space’.61 However, 
as I will go on to speculate, even wave function monism may leave room for primitive 
incompatibility as it was introduced in the previous section. 
 According to wave function monism, there are no particles, except perhaps as 
derivative, emergent entities, in the sense that decoherence may suggest. But we have seen that 
there are reasons to think that this is, at best, an illusory sense, and if this is right then wave function 
monism would really seem to amount to a type of existence monism. Note that, on the face it, the 
                                                 
59 Ney (2013a): 25–6. 
60 See Maudlin (2010). 
61 Ney (2013a): 37. 
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Bohmian approach, which we mentioned in passing above, will not be compatible with wave 
function monism. This is because the Bohmian approach does hold that there are, in addition to the 
wave function, particles with determinate locations in three-dimensional space.62 But Ney observes 
that there are also versions of the Everettian and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) approach to 
quantum mechanics (although we will not discuss them here; GRW is a collapse-approach) that are 
compatible with the denial of wave function monism.63 However, there are similarly different 
versions of the Bohmian approach and it may be that only some of them would be compatible with 
a pluralist view – after all, we saw earlier that there is a clear element of universal ‘connectedness’ 
in the Bohm-Hiley version in particular. Regarding the GRW approach (and other collapse 
theories), David Albert notes that the world will consist of just one physical object, namely, the 
universal wave function.64 While I cannot hope to analyse the ontological status of the wave 
function in detail here – partly because I simply lack the competence to do so and partly because the 
story will differ depending on the interpretation in question – I do hope to make it clear that the 
neo-Aristotelian pluralist has not yet been driven to a corner, whereby only some speculative 
approach to quantum mechanics would save the day.65 All of the options mentioned here are live. 
 Let us take a closer look at what the wave function might tell us about incompatibility. 
Specifically, what does the wave function tell us about the case of seemingly distinct, objective 
‘particles’ that at least look as if they could motivate pluralism about individual substances? 
Consider a two-particle wave function for a system of identical, indistinguishable particles. 
Quantum theory tells us that the probability density of the two particle wave function must be 
identical to the wave function in a situation where the particles have been interchanged. There are 
two ways that this can happen: the symmetric and the anti-symmetric case. In symbols, the 
                                                 
62 Ney (2013a): 38. 
63 Ibid.: 42. 
64 Albert (2013): 54. 
65 The debate concerning the ontological status of the wave function is heated and interesting, see the essays in Ney and 
Albert (eds.) (2013) for a representative selection. 
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symmetric case is ψ(r1, r2) = ψ(r2, r1), and the anti-symmetric case is ψ(r1, r2) = -ψ(r2, r1). Details of 
wave-function symmetry aside, it turns out that particles with symmetric wave functions in this 
scenario have integer or zero intrinsic spin – they are known as bosons – whereas particles with 
anti-symmetric wave functions have half-integer intrinsic spin – they are known as fermions. So, 
here we have what seems like a relatively simple but quite general case regarding the 
incompatibility of two types of fundamental particle, fermions and bosons. If this is correct, then it 
looks like the fermion vs. boson distinction is one of the best candidates for a distinction that 
‘carves nature at its joints’. If such fundamental incompatibilities do exist, then they may be seen as 
tracking worldly incompatibility in Berto’s sense.66 In other words, if incompatibility itself is 
fundamental, then fundamental incompatibilities like the fermion vs. boson distinction could be 
seen as grounded in this worldly incompatibility.  
In the fermion vs. boson case, the incompatibility concerns the representations of the wave 
function, so one might still doubt whether we have arrived at genuinely incompatible properties that 
must be possessed by two distinct ‘objects’ (if we consider the wave function in the lines of wave 
function monism). So the problem is that those who favour wave function monism in particular 
might regard this story to be inherently misleading: we do not really have closed systems like the 
two-particle system described in this example. All we have is the universal wave function and 
fermions and bosons are just aspects of the universal entangled web, loosely speaking. Still, the 
incompatibility featured in this story about fermions and bosons must be rooted in something and 
since it can be modelled with the wave function, even the wave function monist should be able to 
appreciate this. Forget about ‘particles’, what I wish to suggest is that they can be understood as a 
placeholder for features of the wave function that are ultimately responsible for the possibility of 
macro-objects. But insofar as one thing cannot possess two incompatible properties at the same 
time, it seems as if the wave function monist must either insist that this incompatibility itself is only 
                                                 
66 Berto (2015): 11. 
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an illusion, admit that there are at least two distinct things, or try to reduce the distinctness into 
something else. If the friend of substances is right, then we would also have the beginnings of a 
potential solution to the macro-object problem. On this approach, what grounds facts about macro-
objects (and we can here think of any appearance of a ‘particle’ to be a macro-object) is the 
incompatibility that can be traced to the wave function itself.67 
It is worth noting that the speculative approach being developed here assumes a form of 
wave function realism. I don’t wish to make any commitments in this regard myself, but since the 
universal role of the wave function understood in a realist fashion is typically adopted in arguments 
that are causing trouble for neo-Aristotelian substance ontology, it seems that for the sake of 
argument it would be best to adopt this approach and see if we can deal with it. This type of realism 
about the wave function could be considered to suggest that the wave function is at least ‘quasi-
material’, i.e., something close to what we regard as ordinary material reality, even if not quite the 
same thing.68 As Goldstein and Zanghì note, it turns out to be quite tricky to determine the 
ontological status of the wave function – we would first need to know what quantum theory says. I 
cannot hope to make much progress with this issue here. Instead, I’ve focused on tracing the idea of 
incompatibility all the way down to the wave function, since I posited incompatibility as a 
necessary condition for pluralism about substances. But even if we regard the wave function as 
‘real’ – presumably, as a field69 – part of the problem that we now face is how to express 
                                                 
67 As Nic Teh pointed out to me, there is an argument to be constructed here also on the basis of Pauli Exclusion 
Principle (PEP), which states that no two fermions in a closed system can have all the same quantum numbers at the 
same time: the PEP can be seen as a necessary condition for the stability of matter. From this we can infer that the fact 
that matter is extended is itself at least partially based on primitive incompatibility. However, I will not develop this 
argument in more detail here, as I have discussed very similar arguments based on PEP elsewhere, e.g., in Tahko (2009) 
and (2012b). 
68 See Goldstein and Zanghì (2013) for a helpful survey. 
69 See Ney (2013b): 169; ‘The wave function is a field in the sense that it is spread out completely over the space it 
inhabits, possessing values, amplitudes in particular, at each point in this space.’ Another problem here concerns three-
dimensional space: we tend to think of material objects as existing in three-dimensional (or four-dimensional) space, but 
wave function realism would seem to suggest that three-dimensional space is just an illusion, as we need to move to 3N-
dimensional configuration space (Ney (2013b): 177ff.). For further discussion, see North (2013); North argues that 
although three-dimensional space is not fundamental, it can be seen to exist nonfundamentally rather than being merely 
an illusion (ibid.: 197ff.). So, there are some subtleties relating to high-dimensional quantum space, which is typically 
described as a configuration space. Strictly speaking, even this is not quite right, as configuration space is typically used 
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incompatibility in terms of the ‘parts’ of one universal field. It might be suggested that this simply 
means that if this part of the wave function has a certain peak, then that part of the wave function 
cannot have a certain peak. Simplistic as this description is, it may be the only way that we can 
‘solve’ the macro-object problem. Note that this would seem to apply even in the case of wave 
function monism. Ney herself suggests something quite similar, although without explicitly 
referring to incompatibility:  
 
Somehow the wave function grounds the existence of, for example, my desk. This is 
not because my desk is spread out all over the configuration space with parts 
corresponding here to a leg and there to a top. Rather, the persistence of peaks of the 
wave function grounds the existence of my desk. Point-sized regions of these peaks 
correspond to slightly different (classical) ways of there being a desk there, slightly 
different configurations of particles that could make up a desk, among other things. 
If instead, the peaks of the wave function were centered in a disjoint region of 
configuration space, then my desk would not have existed, or there would have been 
a very different kind of desk.70 
 
 This is certainly a controversial story about how we might reduce ordinary three-
dimensional objects to a wave function in configuration space, but it seems clear that in order to 
address the macro-object problem, something on these lines is a promising way to go. By 
‘something on these lines’ I simply mean the requirement that there are persistent peaks in one 
                                                 
to describe the coordinates of particles. I will leave these complications aside, as the idea of incompatibility does not 
depend on the number of dimensions. Similarly, I will leave aside complications relating to relativistic quantum 
mechanics, as do the authors of many of the articles that I have been discussing. 
70 Ney (2013b): 180. 
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region of the wave function that will rule out certain other peaks, just like Ney describes. Consider 
another passage, from Jill North:  
 
For example, there being a table in three-space consists in nothing but the wave 
function’s having a certain shape in its high-dimensional space. It’s true that there is 
a table in three-space; it’s just that this holds in virtue of some other, more 
fundamental facts. The truth about three-space (the grounded) is not a further fact 
beyond the truth about the wave function’s space (the grounds)—that is, it isn’t a 
fundamental fact—even though it is distinct from the grounds and is itself a real 
fact.71 
 
 This passage may remind someone of the earlier reconstrual of Schaffer’s strategy to 
get a plurality of entities via the nonfundamental parts, while the cosmos as a whole is fundamental. 
We have seen that this strategy is problematic. Ney and North both appear to be in the business of 
explaining how we might get our beloved ‘things’ (why is it always tables?) back as 
nonfundamental entities that are grounded in or reduce to the universal wave function in 3N-
dimensional space. On any such view, one will have to postulate some structure that corresponds 
with the classical ways of being. North suggests that this structure could be specified, e.g., by the 
dynamical laws.72 In Ney’s story, the relevant structure seems to come from the persistence of the 
peaks of the wave function. If some story of this type turns out to be correct, then my thesis about 
primitive incompatibility is corroborated: you don’t get even emergent, nonfundamental ‘things’ 
without fundamental incompatibility, because something like this must always be built-in to the 
relevant structure. Otherwise there could be no correspondence to the classical ways of being that 
                                                 
71 North (2013): 198. 
72 North (2013): 200. 
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Ney alludes to. I wish I could say more about what that fundamental, primitive incompatibility 
amounts to, but the problem here is that, being primitive, we might not be able to specify it very 
much beyond the type of stories that I’ve quoted above. Instead, we might attempt a reductio ad 
absurdum: consider what the world would be like if there were no incompatibility. I think that the 
best illustration of this might be something like Dummett’s ‘amorphous lump’, a view according to 
which the world is structureless ‘dough’.73 We do not need to dwell on the anti-realist aspects of 
this idea – the point is simply that any kind of structuring will require some limiting principles, be it 
the dynamical laws or something else, and this immediately introduces an element of 
incompatibility. If this is right, then on any view where there is an underlying structure, there is also 
incompatibility. Presumably, Schaffer himself would not deny this, but the question is: who can 
give the most plausible explanation of this incompatibility? 
 Do we get the typical neo-Aristotelian conception of substance out of all this? 
Probably not. But nor do we get any other very clear ontological picture: the jury is still out there on 
quantum ontology. Of course, we do know some things. For instance, it seems undeniable that on 
all the major approaches, some kind of holism will be present in quantum ontology. However, this 
does not necessarily entail monism, it only entails that there may be more dependence in the world 
than we once thought. To be sure, pluralism will need to be qualified at the end of the day, but if we 
can trace the source of incompatibility to quantum ontology, then there is at least some hope to 
settle the macro-object problem in a manner that preserves the key aspects of neo-Aristotelian 
pluralist substance ontology.74 
 
                                                 
73 See Dummett (1981): 577. 
74 I’d like to thank the editors of this volume, Christina Conroy, and Alastair Wilson for comments on previous drafts of 
this article. The research for this article was supported by two Academy of Finland grants (No. 266256 and No. 
274715). 
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